

/attached paper/

(1) We have no objection to the draft of telegraphic instruction to Ambassador NOMURA as reply material concerning the French Indo-China Problem as submitted by the Navy.

(2) As reply material for the Northern Problem, this draft is offered by the Army according to the purport of Paragraph 2, mentioned above.

/Top Secret/ Stamped

/Marginal notes/

Forwarded for reference.

When the Foreign Office Draft is ready, please discuss it - this is also the Minister's desire (written in red ink).

(Draft) Telegraphic Instructions to Ambassador NOMURA as Reply Material concerning the Northern Problem.

July 11, 1941, the Military Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry /inserted/

Explanation

1. This draft is to be submitted to the Foreign Office as reply material when the U.S. Government questions the Ambassador after the fact of strengthening of the military forces stationed in Manchuria becomes known, (at least for the time being such a thing cannot be made clear) /marginal note/ As the time of dispatching the telegram is a military top secret requiring ample consideration, the Army and Navy are asked to confer and discuss the matter.

2. In view of the circumstance when she sent her military forces to Siberia and next to Iceland, this draft is made with the object of not giving a pretext to, as well as preventing, the United States from making its influence felt in Kamchatka or elsewhere under the pretense of the self-defense and security.

Telegraphic Instruction (Draft)

It is self-evident that our Empire watches with the great interest the development of the war between Germany and Soviet Russia. Japan and Manchukuo directly border the Soviet Union and moreover we are making efforts to establish the East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere. Therefore, our national defense could be endangered through the effects of the European conflict felt in the Far East, or the third power's sphere of influence /Marginal note/ meaning the sale offer of

military bases of operation, etc. of Enkai Province. /TN: Maritime Province where Vladivostok is situated/ and Kamchatka) could spread to the Soviet territories in the Far East by taking advantage of the Russo-German War, but Japan absolutely cannot allow such eventualities to happen.

We are, therefore, strengthening our defensive military forces within the minimum limit required in this regard for the sole purpose of preparing ourselves for just such a serious state of affairs.

IPS DOC. NO. 31C4 (2)

H. E. The AMERICA BUREAU Chief

7 July

Lt. Col. NINOMIYA (Ninomiya seal)

Following drafts are to be sent to you from the Navy.

1. "Telegraphic instructions draft to Ambassador NOMURA as materials for answering questions on our penetration into French Indo-China".

2. "Telegraphic instructions draft to Ambassador NOMURA as materials for answering questions on the management of Northern problems.

Concerning the above-mentioned problems.

1) It is quite dangerous if the matters especially as regards the North leak through to the U.S.A. too early. It is desirable that you discuss the time, etc., at the liaison round-table conference.

2) As to the aforesaid plan, (1) there is generally no objection on the part of the Chief of the Bureau, but about plan (2) the material for answering questions on the management of the Northern question, there are further opinions on the part of the Army.

I report to you by the request of the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau.

IPS DOC. NO. 3104 (2)

H. E. The AMERICA BUREAU Chief

7 July

Lt. Col. NINOMIYA (Ninomiya seal)

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I report to you by the request of the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau.

C E R T I F I C A T EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 136 pages, dated Aug. & Sept., 1941, and described as follows: "JAPANESE-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS" (one volume). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of November 1947

/sgd/ K. Hayashi (seal)
Signature of Official

Witness: /sgd/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of November, 1947

/sgd/ Henry Shimojima
NAME

Witness: /sgd/ Johnson F. Munroe

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity